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PRESERVING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AS THE ANTIDOTE TO
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
JAMES BOPP JR. *

A judiciary independent of a king or executive alone, is a good thing; but
independence of the will of the nation is a solecism, at least in a
republican government.1
Judicial independence is vital for litigants to obtain the justice to
which they are entitled. However, some view judicial elections-and the
inevitable campaign speech that accompany such elections-as a threat
to that independence and have urged steps to move away from elections.
Short of that, they argue that judicial elections are so different that
judicial campaigns can and should be severely curtailed, particularly in
areas involving speech, whether that of the candidate, that of independent
supporters, or that of contributors.
Judicial elections are different but not in the way many thought
before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party
2
of Minnesota v. White. Before White, nearly every state supreme court,
the American Bar Association, and the judicial establishment believed
that judicial elections were categorically different from elections for
. James Bopp, Jr. is an attorney with Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom in Terre Haute,
Indiana, whose practice emphasizes biomedical issues of abortion, foregoing and
withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment and assisted suicide, not-for-profit
corporate and tax law, campaign finance and election law, and U.S. Supreme Court
practice. He successfully argued for the petitioners before the Supreme Court in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 762 (2002).

This article is

adapted from a speech given by the author to the Judical Conference of California on
November 2, 2006.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie Monticello (Dec. 25,
1820), availableat http://www.let.rug.nl/-usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl263.htm.
2. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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other public offices so that the First Amendment did not have full
application to those elections.3 However, the United States Supreme
Court settled that in White, when the Court held that, consistent with the
First Amendment, the states cannot prohibit judicial candidates from
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues.
The breadth of the White opinion has been reflected in the
decisions of three federal circuit courts and about a dozen federal district
courts as an additional twelve judicial canons have been struck down as
incompatible with the strict scrutiny that is required by the First
Amendment under White.4
However, judicial elections are different from elections for the
legislative or executive branch in a very important way because, unlike
other public officials, judges have a dual role. One of the roles that state
court judges share with the political branches is to make law, most

3. This is most clearly evidenced in the adoption by state supreme courts of
some version of the ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct, which substantially restricts
judicial candidates from behaving like legislative or gubernatorial candidates by
drawing narrow parameters around the type of speech judicial candidates can engage
in and around their participation in partisan politics during their campaign.
4. Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (solicitation and
political affiliation canons); Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct
Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004) (order denying stay of preliminary injunction
against Kentucky judicial canons); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, (1 1th Cir.
2002) (solicitation canon); Pa. Family Inst. v. Celluci, 489 F. Supp. 2d 447 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (granting injunction from enforcing pledges and promises clause and
commitment clause); Ind. Right to Life v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879 (N.D. Ind.
2006) (pledges and promises canon) rev'd on other grounds, No. 06-4333, 2007 WL
3120095 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 2007); Carey v. Wolnitzek, 2006 WL 2916814 (E.D. Ky.
Oct. 10, 2006) (solicitation canon); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d
1209 (D. Kan. 2006) (pledge and promise and solicitation canons); Alaska Right to
Life v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Alaska 2005), rev'd on other grounds,
Nos. 05-3902, 05-36027, 2007 WL 2743603 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2007) (pledge and
promise canon); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D.
2005) (pledge and promise canon); Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F.
Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (commitment canon); O'Neill v. Coughlan, No. 04
Civ. 1612 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2004) (striking three canons placing limitations on
judicial campaign materials); Spargo v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003)
(striking several canons, including a political activities canon); Smith v. Phillips,
2002 WL 1870038 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (pledge or promise canon).
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notably in the development of the common law, 5 but in addition, in the
exercise of their discretion, they make law for the litigants before them.
With respect to the development of the common law, in 1977 thenCalifornia Judge Lynn Compton explained the policy-making role for
judges:
[C]ourts are policy-making bodies. The policies
they set have the effect of law because of the power
those courts are given by the Constitution ....

In

short, these precedent-setting policy decisions were
the product of the social, economic, and political
philosophies of a majority of the justices 6who made
up the court at any given time in history.
It is legitimate for judges to be influenced by their views on
public policy in the development of the common law. However, because
judges' views can be relevant to their decision-making, it is also
legitimate for the people to elect judges who reflect their values to such
policy-making positions.
But, more importantly, judges are different in that they are
obligated to decide cases that come before them based on the law and the
facts of that particular case. Legislators and executive branch officials
do not have to do that; they can remake the law by legislation or
executive decree, and they can ignore the facts in so doing. Judges
cannot do this, and, if they do, they illegitimately make law by imposing
their own views through interpretations of statutes or constitutional
provisions that are contrary to the original meaning of those laws.
Finally, legislative and gubernatorial candidates can pledge to
change or abolish laws during their campaigns. It is wrong, however, for
judges to do that. Judges may certainly articulate their views on an issue;
indeed, doing so affords citizens the opportunity to evaluate that judge's
judicial approach to both the current law and to public policy matters.
However, it is a violation of their oath, and it is a denial of one of the
critical roles of a judge, to pledge or promise certain results in a
5. See White, 536 U.S. at 784; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466 (1991)
(discussing judges as policymakers); see also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-15 (1921).
6. Lynn D. Compton, Letter to the Editor, Supreme Court Appointments, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1977, at H4 (alteration added).
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particular case or class of cases.7 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court
has held that the state cannot prohibit legislative candidates from
8
promising how they will deal with certain matters when elected, judges
9
can be so forbidden, consistent with the First Amendment.
Despite these very limited, though significant, differences, many
commentators have expressed alarm at recent criticisms of the judiciary
and at efforts to make judges more accountable to the people through
information gathering about judicial candidates by individuals and
interest groups and thereby to limit judges' independence. Yet criticism
°
of the judiciary has been episodic throughout our history' and it is hard
to justify the claim that recent criticism is worse now than it has ever
been. Recent criticism, and recent efforts to limit the independence of
the judiciary, pale in comparison with previous instances. In the past,
sitting Supreme Court Justices have been impeached by the House,
though not convicted by the Senate, for their judicial opinions." A
sitting President has defied the Court, telling the Court to enforce its
opinions if it can.12 One decision of the United States Supreme Court led
to the election of a President, triggering a civil war in which hundreds of
thousands of American citizens died.' 3 Another past President proposed

7. White, 536 U.S. at 770 ("We know that 'announc[ing] . .. views' on an
issue covers much more than promising to decide an issue a particular way.")
(alteration in original) (emphasis in original)).
8. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
9. See White, 536 U.S. at 813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State may
constitutionally prohibit judicial candidates from pledging or promising certain
results." (alteration added)); Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224,
230 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[S]ome of the statements forbidden by the rule, notably
promises to rule in particular ways in particular cases or types of case[s], are within
the state's regulatory power... " (alteration added)).
10. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of JudicialIndependence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 315, 315 (1999).
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS
OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992).
12. DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE
11.

AMERICAN REPUBLIC 365 (1949) (describing President Andrew Jackson's reaction to
the Court's decisions in the Cherokee Cases).
13. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (narrowly construing the
Constitution's use of the term "citizen" to hold that a black emancipated slave was
not a citizen and thus not entitled to bring suit in federal court).
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packing the Supreme Court with additional members, because he
disagreed with its decisions. 14 Some southern Governors have stood in
the schoolhouse door, defying rulings of federal courts requiring school
desegregation, which resulted in the National Guard being mobilized by
the President.' 5 Finally, current criticism of the judiciary cannot top
what President Thomas Jefferson said in 1820: "The judiciary of the
United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly
working underground to undermine the foundations of our confederated
fabric. They are construing our Constitution from a coordination of a
16
general and special government to a general and supreme one alone.'
However, in a popular democracy, the people are entitled to
criticize the judiciary, just like other branches of government. The Court
held in Bridges v. California17 that courts could not hold newspapers in
civil contempt for commenting on pending state court litigation. The
Court noted that stifling that criticism through "an enforced silence...
would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt [for the
judiciary] much more than it would enhance respect.' 18 Justice Felix
Frankfurter, in dissent, agreed that
[j]udges as persons, or courts as institutions, are
entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than
other persons or institutions. Just because the
holders of judicial office are identified with the
interests of justice they may forget their common
human frailties and fallibilities ....

[J]udges must

be kept mindful of their limitations and of their
ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream
9
of criticism expressed with candor however blunt.'
14. See

MARIAN

C.

MCKENNA,

FRANKLIN

ROOSEVELT

AND

THE

GREAT

CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002).

15. STEPHAN LESHER, GEORGE WALLACE: AMERICAN POPULIST 228-232
(1994).
16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie, Judicial Subversion
(Dec. 25, 1820), available at

http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbintoccer-new2?id=Jef

Lett.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public
&part=-26 1&division=div 1.
17. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
18. Id. at 270-71 (alteration added).
19. Id. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (alterations added).
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If mere criticism alone threatens judicial independence, then it is
20,2
' 21
because a judge lacks courage, or "a mind of reasonable fortitude,
which no law can provide.
In light of this criticism, there have been some recent efforts to
limit the independence of the judiciary through proposals for term limits
and the establishment of judicial misconduct boards and through
jurisdiction stripping. Judicial independence is an important element of
ensuring justice for litigants. However, the judiciary receives that gift
because of its limited role. Because our country is based on popular
sovereignty and democracy, the Founders of our Constitution were able
22
to describe the judiciary as the least dangerous branch: the limited role
of the judiciary was understood to be interpreting and applying the law,
not setting public policy for the country. Except for the development of
the common law, the public policy-setting role was to reside in the
legislative and executive branches. So there is a tradeoff: the judiciary is
given substantial independence, which is vital to the central role of a
judge to apply the law impartially, because the judicial branch is given a
modest role in the development of public policy. If judges were given a
predominant role in setting public policy, then it would deny popular
sovereignty and democracy to make them independent of appropriate
accountability to the people.
Thus, it is judicial activism that threatens judicial independence.
Chief Justice John Roberts has recently explained that
Courts should not intrude into areas of policy
reserved by the Constitution to the political
branches .... [J]udges should be constantly aware

that their role, while important, is limited. They do
not have a commission to solve society's problems,
as they see them, but simply to decide cases before
them according to the rule of law. When the other
their
exceed
government
of
branches
constitutionally mandated limits, the courts can act
20. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 973,
988-89 (2001).
21. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 278 (quoting Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,
247 U.S. 402, 425 (1918) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

22.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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to confine them to the proper bounds. It is judicial
restraint, however, that confines judges to their
proper constitutional responsibilities."
Justice Scalia has also recently made the connection between
judicial independence and judicial activism:
We can talk about independence as if it is
unquestionably and unqualifiedly a good thing. It
may not be. It depends on what your courts are
doing ....
The more your courts become policymakers, the less sense it makes to have them
entirely independent ....
When [courts] leap into
making [public policy], they make themselves
politically controversial and that's what places their
independence at risk.24
Judge Pam Rymer of the Ninth Circuit has commented on her
own judicial activist colleagues:
My activist colleagues would probably say that the
judge's primary role is to protect individual rights
and to achieve social justice, that social justice is
the guiding principle of the judicial branch. And
they would say that they should view the
Constitution as a set of very broad principles to be
interpreted in light of contemporary problems. In
my own view, this kind of judicial philosophy
leads a judge . . .to behave more like a legislator
25
than like a judge.
Since the nation was founded on the belief in popular
sovereignty and democracy, the people must consent to the adoption of
public policy. If judges seize power to set the public policy agenda of
23. Judge John Roberts' Judiciary Committee Questionnaire, 66, available at
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legislative-issues/federalissues/hot-issues in congress/
supreme courtwatch/RobertsQuestions2.pdf (alteration added).
24. John Heilprin, Scalia Sees Shift in Court's Role, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
2006, at A19.
25. Pamela A. Rymer, Remarks at Stanford panel entitled Judicial
Independence: The Role of Politics and the Rule of Law (2004), in 39 STANFORD
LAW 15, 16 (Winter 2005).
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the country, then judges must expect to be less independent and more
accountable to the people. Indeed, it is a grave offense to popular
sovereignty and democracy to interpret the Constitution to add rights that
were not present in that Constitution when the people ratified it. It is
also a grave offense to write out of the Constitution rights that were in
that Constitution when it was consented to by the people. The people
have chosen to limit the government and to guarantee rights in certain
ways through the adoption of the Constitution, so it violates the
principles of democracy and popular sovereignty to change that
Constitution by judicial fiat.
This nation, however, has experienced numerous instances of
27
26
judicial activism. Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson,
29
28
Wickard v. Filburn, Kelo v. City of New London, and McConnell v.
FEC3 are just a few examples of the Court undermining rights or other
32
provisions in the Constitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 1 Roe v. Wade, and
Lawrence v. Texas33 are examples of the Court adding rights. For
example, political speech is at the core of the First Amendment's
mandate that Congress should "make no law," 34 and nude dancing is at

26. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (narrowly interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's
interest in equality to exclude social distinctions and upholding state-imposed racial
segregation on railway carriages as constitutional).
28. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (asserting a broad scope to the Commerce Clause to
hold that a farmer's wheat production could be constitutionally regulated and
penalized).
29. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (broadly construing the Takings Clause to hold that
private property could be constitutionally taken away from citizens so long as doing
so served a public purpose).
30. 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (narrowly construing the First Amendment's free
speech clause to uphold campaign finance restrictions and prohibitions).
31. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to contraception to unmarried
persons based on an implied right to privacy).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right to an abortion under a
generalized notion of privacy implicit in the Constitution).
33. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (extending the Constitution's implied right to privacy
to include sexual orientation and striking down as unconstitutional a law
criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
34. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (holding that Ohio election
laws violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
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35

best at its periphery, but the Court has given much greater protection to
nude dancing than it does political speech. Political candidates are
required by law to run under their real names but nude dancers are not.
Political contributions can. be limited, 36 but "contributions" to nude
dancers are not. Political candidates can'be prohibited from giving any
quid pro quos for their contributions, 37 but nude dancers are in many
ways free from such restrictions. Political candidates must put a
disclaimer on their advertising, as but it took a 5-4 Supreme Court
decision to allow a state to 'require pasties and a G-string on a nude
dancer.39 So some people have come to the conclusion, in surveying the
Court's decisions on abortion, pornography, sodomy, and sexual conduct
generally, that the courts are infected with "a virulent judicial activism"
that "has force-fed a new culture and new definition of virtue, all in the
name of a Constitution that neither commands nor permits such
results., 40 Even if one does not accept this rather apocalyptic view, it is
troubling that the majority of the people of the United States believe that
judges base their decisions on their own personal beliefs rather than on
the application of the law. 41 Thus, judicial activism undermines public
support for an independent judiciary and gives rise to efforts, some
ridiculous and misbegotten, others firmly in the Constitution and in our
tradition, to make judges more accountable and less independent.
they imposed undue burdens on putting smaller political parties on the state's
ballots).
35. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000) (concluding that the

city's ordinance prohibiting all public nudity was content-neutral and that it satisfied
the Court's test for analyzing symbolic speech restrictions).
36. Nixon v. Shrink MO Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). But see Randall v.
Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (deciding that Vermont political expenditure limits
were unconstitutional because they were too restrictive and not narrowly tailored to
the state's interest of preventing both the appearance and practice of corruption).
37. FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm'n, 470 U.S. 80 (1985).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
39. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
40.

ROBERT

H.

BORK, COERCING VIRTUE:

THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES

52 (2003).
41. Maxwell Poll, Judges and the American Public's View of Them, October

2005, available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/releases/051017-poll.asp
(finding that 56 percent agree that "in many cases judges are really basing their
decisions on their own personal beliefs").
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The response by some has been to deny that there is judicial
activism or to say that we do not know what it is. There is just no
question that there is judicial activism. Judicial activism is marked by an
attitude or disposition that the judiciary can solve legal problems in ways
reserved to the executive or legislative branches. It can also be
evidenced by the substitution of personal preference through creative
interpretation as to what the law should be over current case precedent
establishing that law. 42 Most notably, this is recognized in decisions
upholding a "living constitution" to justify the decision rendered.
Some commentators more broadly define judicial activism as
just a decision with which one does not agree, and others define it as any
striking down of a law or reversing of a precedent, so all one needs to do
is add up how many laws a judge has struck down or precedents he has
43
voted to reverse to determine whether he or she is an activist. But these

redefinitions assume that the Constitution has no real ascertainable
meaning, which limits government or protects rights by imposing
standards on the judiciary on how it should decide cases. But of course,
that is not so; the Constitution is considerably more than that.
So the people have chosen judicial elections in order to hold
judges accountable to the people for the exercise of their power and to
ensure that judges stay within their proper bounds. Seventy-five percent
of those surveyed agreed that "judges who are elected are more fair and
impartial than those who are appointed., 44 (Only 18 percent thought that
if judges were appointed, they would be more fair and impartial.) Fortyseven percent want more judges to be elected, while only 15 percent
46
45
think that fewer should be. The people want fair and impartial judges,
and elections are how they believe that they can get them.

42. Orin S. Kerr, Upholding the Law, LEGAL AFF. (March/April 2003),
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2003/feature-marapr03_
kerr.msp (last visited May 22, 2007).
43. Activism Is in the Eye of the Ideologist, N.Y, TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at
A18.
44. ABA Poll, A Study About Judicial Impartiality, at 4 (Aug. 2002) (on file
with author).
45. Poll, supra note 41 (finding that 46.7 percent answered "more" to the
question: "Do you think that more judges should be elected, that the number of
judges that are elected is about right, or that fewer judges should be elected?).
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Elections have been used successfully to weed out judges who
were biased or activist. Texas District Judge Jack Hampton gave an
unusually light sentence to a defendant convicted of killing two gay men.
Judge Hampton explained that
[t]hese homosexuals, by running around on
weekends picking up teen-age boys, they're asking
for trouble . . . . I don't care much for queers
cruising the streets picking up teen-age boys .... I
put prostitutes and gays at about the same level.
And I'd be hard put to give somebody life for
47
killing a prostitute.
48
Hampton was censured but not removed from office. In 1992,
his remarks were a major campaign issue in his unsuccessful bid for a
seat on the Texas Court of Appeals.4 9
In the 2006 election for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
substantial resources were expended in an election that was clearly
focused upon choosing between judicial activist judge Linda Clifford,
who was willing to "let the [state] constitution breathe," and her
opponent Annette Ziegler, because the balance and direction of the
50
Supreme Court would be established as a result of the election.
Wisconsin voters clearly voiced their opposition to judicial activism by
awarding the seat to Ms. Ziegler, who ran her campaign on the premise

46. By "impartial judges," the people mean judges who will follow the law.,
see National Center for State Courts, How the Public Views the State Courts: A 1999
National Survey, at 33 Fig. 20, availableat http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publicati
ons/ResAmtPTCPublicViewCrtsPub.pdf (finding that 68 percent disagreed or
disagreed strongly with the question: "I would prefer that a judge ignore the law to
ensure that a defendant is convicted."), "without regard to considerations of
popularity." Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 919 (2002) (Breyer, Scalia,

Kennedy, JJ., dissenting from cert. denial).
47. Lisa Belkin, Report ClearsJudge Of Bias in Remarks About Homosexuals,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1989, at A25 (alteration added).
48. Judge is Censured Over Remark on Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1989, at A28.
49. Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat of Judge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,

1992, at B20.
50. John Fund, Cheesy Judges, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2007, at A8.
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that she would be a better-suited replacement for the retiring
conservative justice, whose seat both Clifford and Ziegler were seeking.
Furthermore, the retention election of California Chief Justice
Rose Bird in 1986 is an example of a judge who was perceived as
imposing her own personal views in her decisions contrary to the law. In
every one of more than sixty cases where the death penalty had been
imposed, she voted to reverse. 5 ' In her campaign, Chief Justice Bird
repeatedly emphasized that judicial independence requires judges to set
aside their personal views concerning the issues before the court.
However, "there is no evidence to indicate that voters disagreed with
Bird's view. To the contrary, they clearly felt that Bird and her two
colleagues had interjected her personal
, • • views
.
,,52 into her decisions
As a result, they
regarding the litigation and court administration.
were turned out of office.53
Judicial activism is at the core of the attacks on judicial
independence. Judicial elections are the means by which the people seek
to ensure that judges stay within their proper bounds and to ensure that
judges develop the common law in a manner consistent with the values
of the people. Judicial restraint is the key to maintaining judicial
independence. Those who are genuinely concerned about maintaining
judicial independence should focus on whether judges are restrained and
54
what it means to restrain the exercise of their power. Without judicial
restraint, calls for judicial independence may just be viewed as a way to
protect judges who want to impose their own personal views contrary to
the law. The only way to protect judicial independence is to exercise
judicial restraint.
51. Ann Levin, Rose Bird, Two Others Lose Posts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Nov. 5, 1986, at A3.
52. John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the CaliforniaJustices: the
Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70 JUDICATURE
348, 355, April-May, 1987 (emphasis in original).
53. Such results are rare. Of the 3912 retention elections in ten states between
1964 and 1994, only fifty judges were defeated (approximately 1 percent). Larry
Aspin & William K. Hall, Thirty Years of JudicialRetention Elections: An Update,
37 Soc. Sci. J. 1, 3, 8 (2000).
54. See Clarence Thomas, Francis Boyer Lecture at the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research: Be Not Afraid (Feb. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/publD. 15211 ,filter.all/pubdetail.asp.

